This note addresses two of Gibbard's central contentions in Meaning and Normativity: first, that the concept of meaning is normative, and second, that an expressivist account of semantic concepts and statements can shed light on the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining intentionality in naturalistic terms.
entailments 'could only be analytic or conceptual' (Gibbard 2012, 23) . That is, ascriptions of meaning, such as 'Pierre means dog by "chien"' , entail ascriptions of oughts, such as 'Pierre ought to …' and these entailments hold in virtue of the meaning of 'meaning, ' or equivalently, in virtue of the concept meaning. Anyone who grasps the concept meaning must accept the normative entailments of meaning ascriptions.
What are the normative entailments of meaning ascriptions? Here are two examples drawn from Gibbard's discussion, where the first statement of each pair is said to conceptually or analytically entail the second 2 : (1a) The sentence 'schnee ist weiss' in Ursula's language means snow is white.
(1b) Ursula ought to accept 'schnee ist weiss' iff snow is white. (2a) Pierre's sentence 'les chiens aboient' means dogs bark. (2b) If Pierre has sufficient undefeated evidence that dogs bark in an epistemic circumstance E, then Pierre ought to accept the sentence 'les chiens aboient' in E.
If these entailments are analytic, as Gibbard suggests, then anyone who grasps the concept meaning must accept that 1a entails 1b, and that 2a entails 2b, on pain of irrationality or conceptual confusion. Contra Gibbard, it is possible for someone to sensibly deny these entailments without thereby revealing either irrationality or confusion about the concept meaning. First, consider an evidentialist, such as William Clifford, who holds that one ought never to believe anything on insufficient evidence (Clifford 1877) . Suppose that we present Clifford with a hypothetical scenario in which Ursula is a speaker of German; the sentence 'schnee ist weiss' means that snow is white in Ursula's language; snow is in fact white; but Ursula has never seen snow, and lacks any testimonial evidence as to its color. Since Ursula lacks sufficient evidence that snow is white in this scenario, Clifford would judge that Ursula ought not to believe snow is white. Now, according to Gibbard, one way to believe snow is white is to accept a sentence in a language one understands that means that snow is white (cf. Gibbard 2012, 27, 44) . So, Clifford's judgment that Ursula ought not to believe snow is white is tantamount to the judgment that Ursula ought not to accept the sentence 'schnee ist weiss' .
2 The first example occurs on pg. 40 of Gibbard 2012; with minor stylistic variations, while the second is reconstructed from Gibbard's discussion of analyticity and synonomy in chapter 6. Some further examples which occur in the text are somewhat puzzling. For instance, Gibbard says: 'I ought not to believe, all at once, that snow is white and that nothing is white -and that ties in with the meaning of our term "nothing"' (Gibbard 2012, 13) . Even if it is true that I ought not to believe both that snow is white and that nothing is white, this seems not to have anything to do with the meaning of the term 'nothing' . For it is arguably true that Kaveri, a monolingual speaker of Konkani, ought to not to believe that snow is white and nothing is white and this has little to do with the meaning of our term 'nothing' .
Thus, Clifford would accept 1a but not 1b. Yet, in so doing, he displays neither irrationality nor confusion about the concept meaning. Even if we think Clifford is mistaken, his mistake is not conceptual, because his reasons for rejecting the entailment from 1a to 1b have to do with his evidentialism, and nothing to do with his grasp of the concept meaning. Thus, 1a does not analytically entail 1b. It can be shown in a similar fashion that the entailment from 2a to 2b is not analytic. Consider Blaise Pascal (1670) , who holds that there can be pragmatic reasons for belief. Suppose that we present Pascal with a hypothetical situation in which Pierre is a monolingual speaker of French who has sufficient undefeated evidence that dogs bark, but is promised eternal bliss if he does not accept the sentence 'les chiens aboient' and eternal torture if he does. With regard to this situation, Pascal would accept 2a, but deny that Pierre ought to believe dogs bark. Since Gibbard assumes that believing dogs bark is equivalent to accepting a sentence in one's language that means dogs bark, it follows that Pascal would reject 2b. Yet in so doing, he need neither display irrationality nor confusion about the concept meaning. Even if Pascal's view that there can be pragmatic reasons for belief is mistaken, his mistake is not conceptual. His grounds for rejecting the inference from 2a to 2b have to do with his pragmatism, and not at all to do with his grasp of the concept meaning.
3 Thus, 2a does not analytically entail 2b. One way to respond to these objections might be to appeal to the notion that there are distinct spheres of normativity: such as inter alia, epistemic, prudential, and semantic normativity. One might then say that what 1a and 2a entail are 1c and 2c, respectively: (1c) Ursula semantically ought to accept 'schnee ist weiss' iff snow is white. (2c) If Pierre has sufficient undefeated evidence that dogs bark in an epistemic circumstance E, then Pierre semantically ought to accept the sentence 'les chiens aboient' in E.
One could argue that even if Clifford could sensibly reject the inference from 1a to 1b, he would have to be conceptually confused to reject the inference from 1a to 1c. What Clifford ought to say about Ursula's case is that she epistemically ought not to believe that snow is not white, but that she semantically ought to accept the sentence 'schnee ist weiss' nonetheless. Similarly, one could argue that even if Pascal could sensibly reject the inference from 2a to 2b, he would have to be conceptually confused to reject the inference from 2a to 2c. What Pascal should say is that while Pierre
3
One might try to argue that he fails to grasp the concept of belief, because beliefs cannot be formed at will, but that would not help Gibbard in his efforts to argue that the concept of meaning is normative. In any case, Gibbard accepts that beliefs can be formed at will (Gibbard 2012 ).
prudentially ought not to believe dogs bark, he semantically ought to accept the sentence 'les chiens aboient' nonetheless. However, this response is not available to Gibbard, who claims that semantic ascriptions entail 'Ewing's primitive oughts' . In Ewing's sense of 'ought' to say 'you ought to do X' is to say that you ought to do X all things considered, or that you have a conclusive reason to do X (Gibbard 2012, 14) . Thus, Gibbard's official view is that 1a entails 1b, and 2a entails 2b, where both 1b and 2b are understood as all things considered oughts, not that 1a entails 1c nor that 2a entails 2c.
Moreover, it is possible for someone to sensibly reject the inference from 1a to 1c, or from 2a to 2c, without displaying any conceptual confusion, so even these entailments are not plausibly analytic. To see why, it will help to generalize 1c and 2c. Let S be a subject; assume that sentence 's' means P in the language spoken by S, and that 's' is true iff p. We can generalize 1c and 2c as follows:
(1d) S semantically ought to accept 's' iff p. (2d) If S has sufficient undefeated evidence that p is true in an epistemic circumstance E, then S semantically ought to accept 's' in E.
First, note that 1d and 2d can come into conflict. Assume that Anna speaks Swedish, in which 'häxor existerar' means witches exist; it is not the case that witches exist; yet Anna has sufficient undefeated evidence that they do. In this case, 1d entails that it is not the case that Anna ought to accept 'häxor existerar' whereas 2d entails that S ought to accept it. Someone who holds that truth is all that matters for sentence acceptance (belief ) would accept 1d but not 2d, whereas someone who holds that evidence is all that matters for sentence acceptance (belief ), would accept 2d but not 1d. Yet neither of them need be confused about the concept meaning. Their dispute concerns whether one semantically ought to accept a sentence (believe something) if and only if it is true, or whether one semantically ought to accept a sentence (believe something) only if one has sufficient undefeated evidence that it is true. It is possible for someone to endorse either position without thereby displaying confusion about the concept meaning. Perhaps Gibbard would argue that the dispute between the advocate of 1d and the advocate of 2d is a substantive normative dispute. He might suggest that the concept meaning is normative in the sense that to grasp the concept meaning one must accept that meaning ascriptions have some normative implications -one ought to accept either 1d, 2d, or similar -though it does not matter which normative implications one takes semantic ascriptions to have. This suggests that Gibbard's view is that the concept meaning is a 'thin' normative concept like good or ought which lacks any significant descriptive content, rather than a 'thick' normative concept like justice or courage, which has a significant descriptive content (cf. Gibbard 2012, 39) .
Why should we think that meaning is a thin normative concept? Many semantic anti-normativists will be inclined to deny that meaning ascriptions have any normative entailments. Since I count myself among the semantic anti-normativists, I take it to be sensible to deny that meaning ascriptions have normative entailments. 4 However, Gibbard gives three reasons for accepting the normativity thesis.
5 The first one is that the normativity of the concept meaning explains why certain basic oughts follow from semantic ascriptions 'invariably' (Gibbard 2012, 16) . But this rings hollow in light of the foregoing discussion. As we have seen, in the cases above, there are sensible grounds to question whether semantic ascriptions really do entail basic oughts invariably.
The second reason Gibbard provides in support of the normativity thesis has to do with the hard problem of intentionality. Attempts to analyze meaning in naturalistic terms have failed, he says, and this can be explained by the hypothesis that meaning is normative (Gibbard 2012, 16-17) . But it would be premature to conclude that meaning is normative on this basis. Arguably, phenomenal concepts resist reductive analysis, but it does not follow that they are normative.
The third reason Gibbard provides is that viewing the concept meaning as normative promises a satisfactory expressivist resolution to the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining in non-semantic, non-intentional terms what makes it the case that an arbitrary sentence or thought has the meaning or content that it does. Whether this is a good reason to accept that meaning is a thin normative concept depends on whether expressivism does offer a satisfactory resolution to the hard problem of intentionality. And that remains to be seen.
Does expressivism resolve the hard problem?
The hard problem of intentionality has a parallel in the hard problem of morality, the problem of explaining in non-moral terms what makes it the case that something is good, bad, right, wrong, or obligatory. Gibbard argues 4 See e.g. Glüer (1999) , Glüer and Wikforss (2009a) , Hattiangadi (2006 Hattiangadi ( , 2007 Hattiangadi ( , 2009 ) and Wikforss (2001) . For a comprehensive review of the issue, see Glüer and Wikforss (2009b) .
5 Gibbard (2012, 16 ) distinguishes between a weak normativity thesis, according to which meaning ascriptions have normative entailments and a strong normativity thesis, according to which the meaning of an expression is defined by the pattern of oughts it entails. Though Gibbard purports to defend both theses, it is only the weak normativity thesis that is relevant to the present discussion.
that since meaning is normative, like good and ought, the brand of expressivism he has developed in considerable detail with respect to morality can be profitably applied to the hard problem of intentionality.
To assess the fruitfulness of extending expressivism from the moral to the intentional domain, it will help to have a picture of how Gibbard's expressivist story goes in the moral domain. The first part of this story involves a rejection of 'straight' naturalism, which seeks to either analyze moral concepts in naturalistic terms or identify moral properties with natural properties. Gibbard has argued in previous work that both strategies fail: any attempt to analyze 'good' in naturalistic terms falls foul of G.E. Moore's Open Question Argument, while attempts to identify goodness with natural properties face difficulties in making sense of genuine, moral disagreement (see Gibbard 2003) . According to Gibbard, straight naturalists mistakenly suppose that moral language and thought is descriptive, that true moral judgments correspond to moral facts and hence that there are moral properties and facts crying out for reductive explanation.
Gibbard advertises a distinctive strategy for avoiding the hard problem of morality. The central claim is that moral statements express moral judgments, and that these are to be understood as a special kind of plan. To judge that stealing is wrong is to be in a state that involves planning to avoid stealing, to disapprove of stealing, to blame for stealing, and so forth; to judge that you ought now to φ entails planning now to φ. Similarly, moral terms such as 'good' and 'ought' as well as the moral concepts they voice, 6 such as good and ought are 'plan-laden' . Crucially, while there are distinctively normative concepts, terms, judgments, and sentences, there need be no distinctively normative properties or states of affairs. For, plan-laden normative concepts nevertheless pick out natural properties, according to Gibbard, and normative judgments refer to natural states of affairs. If the hedonist is right, he says, then 'good' picks out the property of being such as to produce pleasure. 7 We can make sense of morality without postulating any substantial moral facts or properties, and a fortiori, without postulating facts or properties which cry out for naturalistic explanation.
Note that the claim is that there is no need to postulate any substantial moral facts or properties. This does not mean that the expressivist cannot In his 2003, Gibbard primarily discusses the neologisms 'okay to do' and 'thing to do' , but takes them to work in roughly the same way as 'permitted' and 'ought' , so I will focus on the more common normative terms here. 7 note that Gibbard would deny that there is any objective fact of the matter whether the hedonist is right.
It is not immediately clear whether he takes this to imply that there is no fact of the matter which natural property 'good' picks out, or whether 'good' picks out the property of being such as to produce pleasure in the language spoken by the hedonist, and the property of being such as to satisfy desire in the language spoken by the preferentialist.
say (in a deflationary tone of voice) that it is true or a fact that one ought to maximize pleasure, or that stealing has the property of being wrong. According to quasi-realists 8 such as Gibbard, to assert 'it is a fact that stealing is wrong' or '"stealing is wrong" is true' is simply to assert 'stealing is wrong' in a fancy way -all these assertions express a plan-laden attitude of some kind (Gibbard 2003) . Quasi-realists can say 'there are moral properties' and 'there are moral facts' , using 'property' and 'fact' in a deflationary sense.
9 All this is compatible with Gibbard's central thesis that he does not need to postulate any substantial moral properties or facts. Since there is no need to postulate any substantial moral properties, the question what moral properties or facts consist in need not arise.
Gibbard characterizes the expressivist style of explanation as 'oblique': the idea is not to explain straightforwardly what moral facts and properties consist in, but rather to characterize moral language and thought in a way that shows why there is no need for a straightforward explanation of what moral facts and properties consist in. Though expressivism is not a form of reductive naturalism, the result is intended to be hospitable to naturalism. Thus, he says:
Expressivists begin with us as parts of the natural world … Nature and nurture leave us with a vast array of systematic tendencies to represent features of the world around us and to pursue goals. Representation and goal-pursuit we can understand naturalistically. (Gibbard 2012, 237) Crucially, expressivism's naturalistic credentials rest on the assumption that representation and goal-pursuit can be understood naturalistically. That is, the idea is that what is needed for a complete naturalistic explanation of normativity is a fully naturalistic explanation of what it takes to have a moral concept or make a moral judgment. In a nutshell, Gibbard's naturalistic explanation of morality might be stated as follows:
Moral concepts such as good and ought are plan-laden. Since moral concepts are plan-laden, no straight naturalistic explanation of moral properties can be given. But equally, no straight naturalistic explanation is needed. All that is needed for a complete naturalistic explanation of normativity is a naturalistic explanation of what it takes for us to grasp moral concepts of good and ought (etc.). And such an explanation can be given.
Gibbard suggests that the view just sketched in relation to morality can be carried over to the hard problem of intentionality, the problem of explaining, in non-intentional, non-semantic terms, what semantic properties consist in. The straight naturalist with respect to intentionality attempts either to The term is due to Blackburn 1993. 9 It is controversial whether deflationism is a boon for expressivists (cf. Dreier 2004) .
reductively analyze semantic concepts, or to identify them with natural properties. Gibbard suggests that neither strategy succeeds. He takes this to be one of the lessons to be learned from Kripke's skeptical argument (Kripke 1982; Gibbard 2012, 16-17) . Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that this is so. Gibbard presents his oblique style of explanation as a promising alternative: 'As always with expressivistic analyses' , Gibbard says with regard to intentionality, 'the explanation is oblique. I don't explain what "means" means by offering a naturalistic synonym or a Russell-style definition in use. Rather, my goal is to say what state of mind believing a meaning claim amounts to' (Gibbard 2012, 197) . He suggests moreover that this oblique style of explanation promises to be hospitable to naturalism. His account, he says, is 'in a crucial way, naturalistic: it envisages our thinking and assertions as happenings in the natural world. It conceives us entirely as parts of nature, explainable in terms that are not at base mentalistic or meaning-laden' (Gibbard 2012, 18) .
The trouble is that Gibbard's oblique explanation founders when it is applied to intentionality. We can see this clearly if we replace moral concepts with semantic concepts in E 1 to derive an oblique expressivist explanation of intentionality: E 2 : Semantic concepts such as meaning are plan-laden. Since semantic concepts are plan-laden, no straight naturalistic explanation of intentionality can be given. But equally, no straight explanation of intentionality is needed. All that is needed for a complete naturalistic explanation of intentionality is a naturalistic explanation of what it takes for us to grasp semantic concepts such as meaning. And such an explanation can be given.
When the relevant changes are made, the resulting claim appears to be inconsistent. E 2 entails both that there is no need to give a straight naturalistic explanation of intentionality, and that what is needed is a naturalistic explanation of what it takes for us to grasp certain semantic concepts. But the concept of grasping a semantic concept is itself a semantic concept, and an explanation of what it takes to grasp semantic concepts is (at least on the face of it) a straight naturalistic explanation of an aspect of intentionality. So, it seems that a straight naturalistic explanation of intentionality is needed after all. But E 2 entails that no straight naturalistic account of intentionality is possible.
To avoid inconsistency, Gibbard might try to restrict his expressivism to statements about meaning, and claim that statements about what it takes to grasp a semantic concept are non-normative (and hence amenable to straight naturalistic explanation). But this would rob expressivism of any hope of shedding light on the hard problem of intentionality. A semantic expressivism restricted to sentences ascribing meanings to linguistic utterances would be analogous to a moral expressivism restricted to sentences in which 'good' is used, but applied to no other moral terms. Such a restricted expressivism would barely scratch the surface of the hard problem. Hence, we need to assume that the class of sentences to which expressivism is to be applied includes other kinds of semantic ascription -of what constitutes grasp of a concept, for instance, as well as semantic ascriptions to mental states including beliefs, desires, intentions, aims, or plans.
Further difficulties arise when we consider the naturalistic credentials of E 2 . The expressivist's oblique explanation of intentionality must either be bolstered by a straight or substantive explanation of intentionality, or it leads to an infinite regress. To bring these difficulties into sharp relief, it will help to look more closely at what oblique explanation involves. In general, we can say that a complete, oblique naturalistic explanation of some phenomenon entails a naturalistic explanation of language and thought about that phenomenon, or more succinctly, an explanation of the meta-language of that phenomenon:
Oblique Naturalistic Explanation: If an explanation, E, is a complete oblique naturalistic explanation of X then E naturalistically explains the meta-language of X.
In application to intentionality, an explanation E constitutes an oblique explanation of intentionality only if E naturalistically explains the semantic meta-language, that is, ascriptions of meaning and content, or what making semantic judgments consists in.
What kind of naturalistic explanation of the semantic meta-language is needed to complete the oblique explanation of intentionality? Gibbard sometimes suggests that what is needed is a straight naturalistic explanation of intentionality. For instance, he says that we can explain representation and goal-pursuit naturalistically as biological adaptations. Indeed, he says that the view that normative convictions are adaptations to do things is, stated in Darwinian terms, 'the prime contention of traditional expressivism' (Gibbard 2012, 237) . This suggests something along the lines of a teleosemantic theory of intentional content, such as the view that has been defended at length by Ruth Millikan (1984 . But an expressivist oblique explanation of intentionality cannot require completion by a straight naturalistic explanation of representation and goal-pursuit, for this would conflict with the contention that semantic concepts are normative, and hence that no straight naturalistic account of intentionality can be given. Straight naturalistic explanations of intentionality, like Millikan's teleosemantic theory, are competitors to expressivism. If intentionality can be explained in teleosemantic terms, it is hard to see why the foray into expressivism is required.
At other times, Gibbard suggests that the claims he makes about what grasp of concepts consist in should be construed as part of the substantive theory, rather than part of the meta-theory. 10 The trouble is that the expressivist's meta-theoretical oblique explanation of intentionality cannot require a particular substantive explanation of what grasp of a concept consists in because the expressivist's meta-theory should be neutral with respect to substantive matters. Gibbard agrees: 'My metathory of oughts and meaning doesn't itself offer such a naturalistic explanation, but it envisages there being one that is correct, and says what its import would be' (Gibbard 2012, 230) . Similarly, in the moral domain, the expressivist's meta-theoretical explanation does not require a hedonistic, perfectionist, or Aristotelian explanation of what good consists in. But if a naturalistic explanation of what it takes to grasp semantic concepts is construed as a substantive theory, and if this substantive theory is required to complete the expressivist's oblique explanation, then the demand for substantive neutrality will be violated.
Gibbard might try conceding that neither a straight nor a substantive naturalistic explanation of semantic language and thought is needed, while still insisting that an oblique naturalistic explanation is what's called for. We needn't explain what it takes for us to use semantic language, have semantic thoughts or grasp semantic concepts, where this involves an analytic reduction of meaning, an identification of meaning with a natural property, or a substantive view. Rather, he might say, we need only give an oblique naturalistic explanation of semantic language and thought; we need only explain our language and thought about our semantic language and thought. However, this move gives rise to a vicious regress. To see why, consider the expressivist's three central claims:
(1) E 2 is an oblique naturalistic explanation of intentionality. From the definition of an oblique naturalistic explanation, if E 2 is an oblique naturalistic explanation of intentionality, then E 2 naturalistically explains the semantic meta-language. As we have seen, E 2 cannot be assumed to
10
The distinction between the substantive and meta-levels plays an important role in Gibbard's discussion. But it is deeply puzzling. Gibbard discusses at some length a dispute rather like that between semantic internalists (represented by the fictive Jerry) and externalists (represented by the fictive Tyler), claiming that this is a substantive normative dispute about what sentences to accept (Gibbard 2012, 39-46 provide either a straight or a substantive naturalistic explanation (given (2) and (3)). Hence, E 2 must provide an oblique explanation of the semantic meta-language. It follows that, (4) If E 2 is an oblique explanation of intentionality, then E 2 obliquely explains the semantic meta-language.
From the definition of an oblique explanation, if E 2 obliquely explains the semantic meta-language, it explains language and thought about the semantic meta-language -it explains the semantic meta-meta-language, if you will. And this explanation too must be oblique, or else the expressivist will be committed to the need for either a straight or a substantive naturalistic explanation of the semantic meta-meta-language, which would violate (3), or with (2) would entail that E 2 does not explain, which conflicts with (1). Given the definition of an oblique explanation, this entails:
(5) If E 2 is an oblique naturalistic explanation of intentionality, then E 2 naturalistically explains the semantic meta-meta-language.
Once again, if E 2 naturalistically explains the semantic meta-meta-language, it must do so obliquely, and hence it must explain the semantic meta-meta-meta-language. And so on, ad infinitum. To obliquely explain what meaning consists in, the expressivist proposes to obliquely explain what meaning ascriptions consist in, and to obliquely explain what meaning ascriptions consist in, the expressivist proposes to obliquely explain what ascriptions of meaning ascriptions consist in, and so on, ad infinitum. The regress is vicious, because it conflicts with the expressivist's claim that E 2 provides an oblique naturalistic explanation of intentionality in the first place: from the definition of an oblique naturalistic explanation, if E 2 does provide an oblique naturalistic explanation of meaning and intentionality, then it explains the semantic meta-meta-meta(…)-language. Since E 2 does not entail this infinite chain of explanations, E 2 does not obliquely explain meaning and intentionality naturalistically. Gibbard might reply that the regress is benign. He claims to accept a 'Brandom-like regress' , that 'never provides a final explanation of claims about the meaning of "meaning"' (Gibbard 2012, 198) , suggesting that this is not a particular problem for expressivists: ' We can ask what the phrase "the meaning of 'meaning'" means, and in turn ask about the meaning of that question. At some point, we have to use language without explaining it further' (Gibbard 2012, 198) .
Yet this reply does not address the present concern. Of course, as Gibbard points out, if we wish to explain the meanings of the expressions of an object language, L 0 , we need to state those explanations in a meta-language, L 1 , and we can then ask for an explanation of the meanings of expressions in L 1 . The regress is optional, not forced: if the explanation of the meanings of L 0 are straight explanations -which state non-semantic necessary and sufficient conditions for L 0 expressions to mean what they do -the explanations of expressions in L 0 do not require that a further explanation of the meanings of expressions of L 1 be given. Indeed, in the special case in which L 0 = L 1 , a straight naturalistic explanation of meanings of expressions L 1 is entailed by the explanation of meanings of expressions of L 0 . The regress is plausibly benign because the explanatory value of the explanation of L 0 stated in L 1 does not depend on an explanation of L 1 , L 2 , L 3 (…) and hence does not contradict the claim that the explanation of L 0 stated in L 1 is genuinely explanatory.
In contrast, the regress of oblique naturalistic explanation is forced by the nature of oblique naturalistic explanation and the need to avoid commitment to give any straight or substantive naturalistic explanation. To give an oblique naturalistic explanation of meaning is, by definition, to explain language and thought about meaning. If this explanation is oblique, then it must explain language and thought about language and thought about meaning. If this explanation is oblique, then it must explain language and thought about language and thought about language and thought about meaning. And so on. The regress is vicious because the expressivist claims that E 2 constitutes a complete, oblique explanation of intentionality, while admitting that to be a complete oblique naturalistic explanation of intentionality, E2 must also give an oblique naturalistic explanation of the semantic meta-language, the semantic meta-meta-language, the semantic meta-meta-meta-language (etc.). Yet, an explanation that is put off indefinitely is no explanation at all.
In sum, the expressivist's oblique explanation of intentionality does not live up to the promise of providing a satisfactory resolution to the hard problem of intentionality. An expressivist style oblique explanation of intentionality must either be augmented with a straight or substantive theory of what meaning consists in, or it leads to a vicious regress. This undermines the third reason Gibbard gives in support of the normativity thesis. As a consequence, we have little reason to accept that the concept meaning is normative.
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